How to answer the email and domain questions in a vendor security questionnaire
· By Arshad Ansari · security questionnaire · SPF · DKIM · DMARC · email security
security questionnaireSPFDKIMDMARCemail securityShort answer: read your own records from the outside, write down what you find with a date, and answer only what that evidence shows.
The domain and email section of a vendor security questionnaire is the easiest part to back with proof. The answers sit in public DNS and on your public web server. A reviewer can check them too. So answer with what a reviewer would see.
The questions you will meet
Wording differs between questionnaires. The topics are usually these.
Do you use SPF, DKIM and DMARC?
Check that each record exists and is valid.
- SPF is a TXT record on the domain that lists who may send mail for it.
- DKIM is a public key published under a selector name. You need to know the selector your mail system uses.
- DMARC is a TXT record at
_dmarc.yourdomain. Its policy isnone,quarantineorreject.
A DMARC policy of none only monitors. If a questionnaire asks whether you block spoofed mail, none is not a yes. Say which policy you run.
Can someone spoof your domain?
This depends on your DMARC policy and on alignment. A message can pass SPF and DKIM and still fail DMARC if the domains do not align. Answer with the policy you publish, not with the fact that SPF exists.
Do you enforce TLS and HTTPS?
Check that the site redirects HTTP to HTTPS and that the certificate is valid and not close to expiry. Record the date you checked, because certificates expire.
Do you set security headers?
Look at the response headers your site sends, such as Strict-Transport-Security and Content-Security-Policy. List the ones present. Do not claim the ones missing.
Do you use DNSSEC, MTA-STS or TLS-RPT?
These are optional for many teams. Answer yes or no from the records. A plain no with a reason is better than a vague answer.
Do you publish a security contact?
A security.txt file at /.well-known/security.txt answers this. Check that it exists and that the contact still works.
What this evidence proves, and what it does not
Public checks prove what an outside party can see on the day you checked. They do not prove how you handle mail inside, who can change your DNS, or how you respond to an incident. They are not a penetration test. They do not replace an auditor.
Write answers that stay inside that line. "DMARC policy is reject as of 9 November 2026" is a claim you can stand behind. "Our email is fully secure" is not.
Date everything
DNS changes. Certificates renew. A record that was right in March may be wrong now. Put a date beside each answer and keep the way to re-run the check.
Check your own domain first
The free scan at domainposture.com runs 18 checks on any domain with no signup. It covers the records above plus MX, redirects, CORS, WHOIS, Certificate Transparency, llms.txt and AI-crawler policy. Every result is dated and can be re-run. The scan does not change your DNS. The free scan allows 30 domain scans an hour per address.
The method behind each check is written down in the methodology.
Frequently asked questions
- Can I answer these questions without access to our DNS?
- You can read most answers from public records. Anyone can look up SPF, DMARC, MTA-STS and DNSSEC records, and test TLS and headers from outside.
- Does a passing scan answer the whole questionnaire?
- No. It answers the domain, email and web section only. It says nothing about your internal controls, staff or processes.
- Should I attach a screenshot as evidence?
- A dated result that can be re-run is stronger than a screenshot, because the reviewer can check it again.